نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی - پژوهشی
عنوان مقاله English
نویسندگان English
The Research Program of the Constitutional Economics which began in 1970s by now well known work of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock titled “The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy”, and reached its Golden Age subsequently in 1990s, is founded on methodological individualism and rational choice. It analyzes the rationally expected consequences of alternative constitutional rules by employing the standard method of mainstream economics and its widely recognized analytical techniques, such as Price Theory and Game Theory. This paper presents this research program and emphasizes the need for its application in constitutional engineering.
Constitutional Engineering/Design which means choosing among rules is the most sensitive example of decision-making in a political system. Despite such importance, unfortunately, constitutional theory until now has failed to pay enough attention to the problem of possible political consequences of alternative constitutional rules. This is because in designing a constitution, we need some model to analyze those rationally expected consequences of different alternative rules and predict political behaviors and reactions, and classic theories of constitutional engineering lack such model.
کلیدواژهها English