1
Assistant Professor of Private Law and Faculty Member of Law Department, Isfahan University
2
Ph.D. Student of Private Law, Isfahan University
10.22096/law.2017.27917
Abstract
The ultimate goal of any legal system is to codify comprehensive laws, based on which its citizens would obtain their legal rights efficiently when in trouble, and no injustice would be done to anybody. For this purpose it is enough for the judge to arrange a legal analogy, conform the case to a preexisting rule (Major Premise), and conclude. The judicial facts prove this analysis to be simplistic and far from reality. Not only identifying the subject (Minor Premise) comes with great complexities, but also due to reasons such as ambiguity, flaws and conflict of laws, determining the applicable law is faced with serious challenges. In most cases, the judge is faced with a number of solutions. The interpretive rules would be useful here to prefer one of the possibilities. But unlike rules of formal logic, rules of interpretation lack the necessity feature, therefore it is not impossible to apply more than interpretive rule, with conflicting results in one case. In practice, the most important factors assisting a judge to choose a solution are intuition and legal mysticism of the judge. However, this secret agent conceals itself under the rules of interpretation.
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Alsharif,M. M. and Araei,H. (2017). Pluralism of Legal Reasoning in Light
of Conflicting Interpretation. Journal of Comparative Law, 4(1), 3-26. doi: 10.22096/law.2017.27917
MLA
Alsharif,M. M. , and Araei,H. . "Pluralism of Legal Reasoning in Light
of Conflicting Interpretation", Journal of Comparative Law, 4, 1, 2017, 3-26. doi: 10.22096/law.2017.27917
HARVARD
Alsharif M. M., Araei H. (2017). 'Pluralism of Legal Reasoning in Light
of Conflicting Interpretation', Journal of Comparative Law, 4(1), pp. 3-26. doi: 10.22096/law.2017.27917
CHICAGO
M. M. Alsharif and H. Araei, "Pluralism of Legal Reasoning in Light
of Conflicting Interpretation," Journal of Comparative Law, 4 1 (2017): 3-26, doi: 10.22096/law.2017.27917
VANCOUVER
Alsharif M. M., Araei H. Pluralism of Legal Reasoning in Light
of Conflicting Interpretation. Journal of Comparative Law, 2017; 4(1): 3-26. doi: 10.22096/law.2017.27917