نوع مقاله : مقاله علمی - پژوهشی

نویسندگان

1 دانشیار دانشکده حقوق و علوم سیاسی دانشگاه تهران

2 دانشجوی دکتری حقوق عمومی دانشگاه تهران

چکیده

برنامه پژوهشی «اقتصاد قانون اساسی» از دهه 1970 توسط جیمز بوکانان و گوردون تالوک[1] با کتاب محاسبه رضایت؛ بنیادهای منطقی دموکراسی مشروطه، شروع شد و در دهه 1990 به اوج و شکوفایی رسید. این شاخه جدید از علم اقتصاد مبتنی بر پیش­فرض فردگرایی و انتخاب عقلانی است و سعی می­کند با بکارگیری روش تحلیلی معمول در اقتصاد متعارف و با استفاده از مدل­های تحلیلی همچون نظریه قیمت و نظریه بازی­ها، پیامدهای احتمالی قواعد مختلف قانون اساسی را بررسی کند. مقاله حاضر، به معرفی این برنامه پژوهشی پرداخته و کاربرد آن را در مهندسی قانون اساسی مورد اشاره قرار داده است. زیرا به­رغم اهمیتی که مهندسی قانون اساسی دارد، متأسفانه نظریه حقوق اساسی تاکنون از منظر پیامدهای احتمالی قواعد مختلف قانون اساسی بر حیات سیاسی و اقتصادی، به بررسی مسئله مهندسی قانون اساسی نپرداخته است. مهندسی قانون اساسی نیازمند مدلی تحلیلی است که با آن بتوان رفتارهای سیاسی و همچنین، واکنش­های افراد را نسبت به قواعد قانون اساسی، پیش­بینی کرد. اقتصاد قانون اساسی مدل تحلیلی مناسبی در این خصوص ارائه می­دهد.



[1].  Buchanan J; and Tullock G

کلیدواژه‌ها

عنوان مقاله [English]

An Study of Foundations and Tools of Constitutional Economics and Its Application in the Constitutional Engineering

نویسندگان [English]

  • Abbas Ali Kadkhodaei 1
  • Moslem Aghaei Togh 2

1 Associate Professor, Faculty of Law and Political Science, University of Tehran

2 PhD student in Public Law, University of Tehran

چکیده [English]

The Research Program of the Constitutional Economics which began in 1970s by now well known work of James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock titled “The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy”, and reached its Golden Age subsequently in 1990s, is founded on methodological individualism and rational choice. It analyzes the rationally expected consequences of alternative constitutional rules by employing the standard method of mainstream economics and its widely recognized analytical techniques, such as Price Theory and Game Theory. This paper presents this research program and emphasizes the need for its application in constitutional engineering.
Constitutional Engineering/Design which means choosing among rules is the most sensitive example of decision-making in a political system. Despite such importance, unfortunately, constitutional theory until now has failed to pay enough attention to the problem of possible political consequences of alternative constitutional rules. This is because in designing a constitution, we need some model to analyze those rationally expected consequences of different alternative rules and predict political behaviors and reactions, and classic theories of constitutional engineering lack such model. 

کلیدواژه‌ها [English]

  • Constitutional Engineering/Design
  • Constitutional Theory
  • Constitutional Economics
  • Economic Analysis
  • Game Theory
  1. منابع

    الف- فارسی

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