نوع مقاله : مقاله پژوهشی
نویسندگان
1 دانشیار دپارتمان حقوق، دانشگاه مفید، قم، ایران.
2 دکتری حقوق بین الملل عمومی، دانشکده علوم انسانی، دانشگاه آزاد اسلامی، واحد قم، قم، ایران.
چکیده
سازوکار کنونی حاکم بر حل‌وفصل اختلافات دولت- سرمایه‌گذار مبتنی بر داوری سرمایه‌گذاری بین‌المللی اعم از داوری موردی و یا نهادی است. رژیم کنونی این سازوکار به علت نقصان‌های ناشی از صدور احکام متعارض و متضاد، به چالش کشیدن دولت‌ها از منظر مسئولیت بین‌المللی، آسیب به برخی از اصول بنیادین حقوق بین‌الملل سرمایه‌گذاری، هزینه‌های بالا، اطاله رسیدگی، عدم تخصص کافی داوران در حوزه‌های سرمایه‌گذاری، معاهده‌یابی توسط سرمایه‌گذاران و اتخاذ رویکردهای متناقض دیوان‌های داوری در این باره، فقدان رویه در داوری‌ها و نبودن استیناف با چالش‌های عمده‌ای مواجه شده است. این باور وجود دارد که تاسیس یک دیوان دائمی سرمایه‌گذاری بین‌المللی برای رسیدگی به دعاوی دولت‌ها- سرمایه‌گذاران بین‌المللی، با الگوبرداری از سازوکار منحصربه‌فرد چندجانبه حل اختلافات سازمانتجارت جهانی، کارآمدتر و مؤثرتر از سازوکار کنونی داوری بین‌المللی سرمایه‌گذاری عمل خواهد کرد و از کاستی‌های یادشده خواهد کاست و گامی نیز در تقویت نظام حل‌وفصل اختلافات دولت- سرمایه‌گذار بر خواهد داشت.
کلیدواژه‌ها
عنوان مقاله [English]
Reform in the Structure of the Investor- State Dispute Settlement and Feasibility Study on the Establishment of the International Investment Permanent Court
نویسندگان [English]
- Seyed Mostafa Mir Mohammadi 1
- Mehran Khamisizadeh 2
1 Associate Professor, Department of Law, Mofid University, Qom, Iran.
2 Ph.D. in Public International Law, Faculty of Human Sciences, Islamic Azad University, Qom Branch, Qom, Iran.
چکیده [English]
The Current Mechanism of the Investor- State Dispute Settlement is based on Institutional and Ad, hoc International investment Arbitration. The Current Regime of this mechanism has faced with some deficiencies including: Issuance of the inconsistent Awards, Challenging the Governments from international liabilities point of view, Damaging on some fundamental principles of investment international law, High costs, lack of expertise of arbitrators in investment fields, different approaches of the Arbitration courts on Treaty Shopping, Lack of precedent, lack of appeal mechanism and etc. it believes that establishment of an International Investment permanent court with aspiration of the unique Multilateral dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) can act as more Consistent, Efficient and Effective in settlement of the disputes of investors- States, in comparative of the current system of the international investment arbitration. Moreover, this new system can reduce the afor-said deficiencies and in particular can take step on strengthening the investor- State Dispute Settlement.
کلیدواژه‌ها [English]
- Investor-State Dispute Settlement
- Investment Arbitration
- International Investment Permanent Court
- Inconsistence Awards
- Investment International Law
- World Trade Organization
ـ برانلی، یان (1396)، اصول حقوق بین‌الملل عمومی، مترجم محمد حبیبی مجنده، چاپ اول، قم: دانشگاه مفید.
ـ پیران، حسین (1393)، مسائل حقوقی سرمایه‌گذاری بین‌المللی، چاپ دوم، تهران: گنج دانش.
ـ رئیسی، لیلا (1385)، «بررسی و ارزیابی شیوه‌های حل‌وفصل اختلافات مربوط به مالکیت معنوی در وایپو و تریپس»، فصلنامه حقوقی مفید، شمارۀ 58، صص 107-128.
ـ سلطان‌زاده، سجاد (1395)، ساختار و رویه داوری مرکز بین‌المللی حل‌وفصل اختلافات سرمایه‌گذاری (ایکسید)، تهران: خرسندی.
ـ هردگن، ماتیاس (1397)، اصول حقوق بین‌الملل اقتصادی، مترجمان محمد ضیایی بیگدلی و صادق ضیایی بیگدلی، چاپ اول، تهران: گنج دانش.
UNCTAD (2010). “Investor –State Dispute: Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration”, UN Publication.
ـ UNCTAD (2015). “Taking Stock of IIA Reform”, No. 1, March 2015, Issue Note, UN Publication.
ـ Franck, Susan D (2005). “The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatization Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions”. Fordham Law Review, Vol. 73, Issue. 4, pp.1521-1625.
ـ Howard, David M (2017). “Creating Consistency Through a World Investment Court”, Fordham International Law Journal, Vol. 41, Issue. 1, Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press. Available at: http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/il, pp. 1-52.
ـ L'Heureux-Dube, Claire (2000). “The Dissenting Opinion: Voice of the Future?” Osgoode Hall Law Journal, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 496-517, http//digitalcommons.osgoode.ca/ohlj/vol38/iss3/4.
ـ Mackenzie Ruth, & Sands, Philippe (2003). “International Courts and Tribunals and Independence of the International Judge”, Harvard International Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 1, pp. 271-286.
ـ Mosk, Richard M & Ginsburg, Tom (1999). “Dissenting Opinions in International Arbitration”. International Law Association, Finland Branch, ISBN: 951-97892-2-7, pp. 259-284.
ـ Kaufmann- Kohler, Gabrielle & Potesta Michele (2016). Can the Mauritius Convention serve as a model for the reform of Investor- State arbitration in connection with the introduction of a permanent investment tribunal or an appeal mechanism?, Geneva: Geneva Center for International Dispute Settlement (GCIDS).
ـ Ruiz, Amalur Marcos (2016). Dispute Settlement Mechanism in International Investments: is that a way towards the future?, Master Thesis, International Business Lae LLM, ANR.298181, Tilburg: Tilburg University.
ـ EU Parliament (2014). Investor- State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Provisions in EUs International Investment Agreements, Vol. 2, Luxembourg: Publications Office of the EU.
ـ Kaufmann -Kohler Gabrielle (2005). “In Search of Transparency and Consistency: ICSID Reform Proposal”, Transnational Dispute Management (TDM), Vol. 2, Isuue. 5, pp. 1-8.
ـ Lee, Eunjung (2015). Treaty Shopping in International Investment Arbitration: How often it occurred and how it been perceived by Tribunals, No. 15-167, London: Department of International Development (LSE), London School of Economics & Political Sciences.
ـ Strezhnev Anton (2015). “You Only Dissent Once: Re-Appointment and Legal Practices in Investment Arbitration”, Harvard University, Department of Government, pp. 1-20.
ـ UNCITRAL Secretariat (2016). “The Mauritius Convention on Transparency– A model for Further Reform of Investor- State Dispute Settlement”, E15 Task Force on Investment Policy.
-Metal clad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/97/1.
ـ Pope & Talbot Inc. v. The Government of Canada, NAFTA UNCITRAL,2002
ـ Palma Consortium Limited v. Bulgaria ICSID Case No.ARB/03/24, Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005.
ـ Phoenix Action Ltd. v. Czech Republic, ICSID Case No.ARB/06/5 (April 15, 2009).
ـ Ronald S. Lauder V. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (Final Award), 13 September, 2001, Stockholm Award.
ـ Ronald S. Lauder v. The Czech Republic, UNCITRAL (Final Award), 3 September 2001, London Award.
ـ S.D. Myres, Inc.v. the Government of Canada, NAFTA UNCITRAL, Final Award,2002
ـ S.G.S v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan (ICSID Case No.ARB.01/13) Decision on Jurisdiction. August 6, 2003.
ـ S.G.S v. Republic of Philippine (ICSID Case No.ARB.02/6) Decision on Jurisdiction. January 29, 2004.
https://pca-cpa.org/en/cases/.
ـ www.uncitral.org.
ـ Muchilinski, Peter (2010). “The COMESA Common Investment Area: Substantive Standards and Procedurals Problems in Dispute Settlement”, (SOAS School of Law Legal Studies, Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 11, 2010, School of Oriental and African Studies Universities of London. Available at: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/22042/.
ـ Sauvant, Karl P. The International Investment Law and Policy Regime: Challenges and Options. E15Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 2015. www.e15initiative.org/.
ـ Task Force Paper Regarding the Proposed International Court System (ICS), (2006). European Federation of Investment LAW and Arbitration (EFILA), www.efila.org.
ـ UNCITRAL Secretariat. The Mauritius Convention on Transparency — A Model for Further Reforms of Investor-State Dispute Settlement. E15Initiative. Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and World Economic Forum, 2016. www.e15initiative.org/.
)